Responsible Officers Get Green Light at the
Intersection of the Tax and Bankruptcy Codes;
Bankruptcy Code Section 105 Can Be Used to
Order the IRS to Apply Debtor Tax
Payments to Trust Fund Taxes
I.

INTRODUCTION

Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code) provides
that a bankruptcy court "[m]ay issue any order, process orjudgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions
of [the Code]."' Section 105(a) is generally regarded as the codification of the bankruptcy court's equitable powers2 and often
characterized as a very broad grant ofjurisdictional power.- The
section is broader in its statutory language than its predecessor,
adding the word "appropriate" to the word "necessary." 4 It was
adopted to allow a bankruptcy court to exercise jurisdiction commensurate with the expanded powers and functions granted by
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.' The exercise of this broad
equitable power, however, is not without its constraints. 6 The
courts have confined the issuance of section 105(a) orders to ac11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988). Section 105(a) provides in full:
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary
or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of
this title providing for the raising of an issue by a party in interest
shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte, taking any
action or making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of
process.
Id.
2 SeeJohnson v. First Nat'l Bank of Montevideo, Minn., 719 F.2d 270, 273 (8th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012 (1984) (citations omitted). See also, H.R. No.
95-595, 95th Cong. Sess. 316 (1977) (section 105 "[c]over[s] any powers traditionally exercised by a bankruptcy court").
S Leal, The Power of the Bankruptcy Court.- Section 105, 29 S. TEX. L. REV. 487, 490
(1988) ("There is general agreement that Congress has expressly granted very
broad powers in section 105 to judges exercising federal bankruptcy jurisdiction.").
4 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUFTCY

105.01 (15th ed. 1983).

Section 2a(15) of the

prior Bankruptcy Act empowered bankruptcy courts to:
Make such orders, issue such process, and enter such judgments, in
addition to those specifically provided for, as may be necessary for the
enforcement of the provisions of this act; provided, however, that an
injunction to restrain a court may be issued by the judge only.
Id. (emphasis added).
5 See S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 29 (1978).
6 Johnson, 719 F.2d at 273 (bankruptcy court powers cannot exceed those expressly or impliedly conferred by Congress) (citations omitted).
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tions which effectuate the provisions of the Code. 7
The Code provisions governing a chapter 118 reorganization
manifest a policy to rehabilitate the debtor-to preserve jobs and
assets. 9 The successful reorganization of a company depends in
large part on the existing management's cooperation, effort and,
in certain cases, capital infusion."0 A financially distressed company often does not have the time and resources to expend on
the search for and installation of new management. New management would not only have to confront the difficult task of becoming intimately familiar with the company's operations, but
also would have to direct the company through a turbulent period. Therefore, unless existing management has been grossly
negligent or incompetent, their retention can be crucial to the
successful restructuring of a company.
One difficult situation that incumbent management may
have confronted prior to the filing of a bankruptcy petition involves the use of trust fund taxes-taxes withheld from employee
7 See, e.g., Sea Harvest Corp. v. Riviera Land Co., 868 F.2d 1077, 1080 (9th Cir.
1989) (section 105(a) must carry out explicit Code provisions, not defeat them);
Official Committee of Equity Security Holders v. Mabey, 832 F.2d 299, 302 (4th
Cir. 1987) (section 105(a) equitable powers important in general bankruptcy
scheme as such powers may encourage innovation by courts, but these equitable
powers are not a license to disregard clear language and meaning of bankruptcy
statutes and rules); In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R., 791 F.2d 524,
528 (7th Cir. 1986) (equitable proceeding does not give judge "free-floating discretion to redistribute rights" according to personal views however enlightened the
views may be).
8 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1988). When Congress enacted the Bankruptcy
Code of 1978, they consolidated the reorganization proceedings under the former
Bankruptcy Act into one business reorganization chapter, chapter 11. See H.R. REP.
No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977).
9 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 220 (1978). The legislative history
indicates that:
The purpose of a business reorganization case, unlike a liquidation
case, is to restructure a business's finances so that it may continue to
operate, provide its employees with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders. The premise of a business reorganization is that assets that are used for production in the industry for
which they were designed are more valuable than those same assets
sold for scrap ....
If the business can extend or reduce its debts, it
often can be returned to a viable state. It is more economically efficient to reorganize than to liquidate, because it preserves jobs and
assets.
Id.
10 See Note, Bankruptcy CourtJurisdictionand the Power to Enjoin the IRS, 70 MINN. L.
REV. 1279, 1292-93 (1986); Otero Mills, Inc. v. Security Bank & Trust (In re Otero
Mills, Inc.), 25 Bankr. 1018 (D.N.M. 1982). See infra note 82 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Otero Mills.
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paychecks and held in trust for the United States." Corporate
officers are often tempted to utilize this pool of funds for current
operating expenses with the expectation of salvaging the corporation and eventually replacing the trust fund taxes.' 2 If they fail
in their efforts to rehabilitate the debtor they, may likely seek
protection under the Code without having replenished the trust
fund tax.
Section 6672 of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.)' 3 was
enacted to deter corporate officers from using trust fund taxes as
working capital' 4 and simultaneously functions as an alternative
means for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to collect such
taxes.15 Section 6672 authorizes the government to hold responsible persons of the corporation 16 personally liable for an amount
II See 26 U.S.C. §§ 3102(a), 3402(a), 7501 (1988). The Internal Revenue Code
requires employers to collect and withhold amounts representing employee income
tax and social security payments from employees' paychecks. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 3102(a) (1988) (requiring employers to deduct FICA taxes); 26 U.S.C. § 3402(a)
(1988) (requiring employers to deduct amounts equal to individuals' income taxes).
The withheld amounts are called trust fund taxes because the employers hold these
taxes in trust for the United States. 26 U.S.C. § 7501 (1988). See also Slodov v.
United States, 436 U.S. 238, 243 (1977) (withheld or otherwise collected funds are
considered "trust fund taxes" because they constitute a "special fund in trust for
the United States").
Section 6672 of the Internal Revenue Code provides in relevant part:
Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over
any tax imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or
truthfully account for and pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in
any manner to evade or defeat any such tax or the payment thereof,
shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be liable to a
penalty equal to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not collected,
or not accounted for and paid over.
26 U.S.C. § 6672 (1988).
12 See Note, supra note 10, at 1279.
13 See supra note 11 for text of Code provision.
14 See Monday v. United States, 421 F.2d 1210, 1216 (1970) (section 6672 of the
I.R.C. "provides a remedy to prevent the unnecessary loss of tax funds") (citations
omitted).
15 IRS Policy Statement P-5-60 (1984), reprinted in 1 ADMINISTRATION, INTERNAL
REVENUE MANUAL (CCH), 1305-14 (1989). The stated IRS policy is:
The 100-percent penalty (applicable to withhold income and employment ... taxes or collected excise taxes) will be used only as a collection device . . . . The withheld income and employment taxes or
collected excise taxes will be collected only once, whether from the
corporation, from one or more of its responsible persons, or from the
corporation and one or more of its responsible persons.
Id.
16 26 U.S.C. § 6672 (1988). See supra note 11 for text. See also 26 U.S.C. § 6671,
defining "person" as including "an officer or employee of a corporation, or a member or employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee, or member is
under a duty to perform the act in respect of which the violation occurs." Id. The
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equal to 100 percent of the total delinquent trust fund taxes.17 In
a chapter 11 restructuring, a typical plan of reorganization would
provide for repayment of all delinquent taxes (ordinary income
taxes and trust fund taxes) within 6 years' 8 and that payments
must first be applied to trust fund taxes.' 9 As a practical matter,
the IRS will seek to apply such tax payments to nontrust fund tax
debts first because the trust fund taxes are guaranteed through
payment by responsible individuals in the corporation. 20 The
debtor and the IRS may therefore disagree about the application
of these tax payments. The debtor may argue that the IRS must
respect the application of these payments to trust fund taxes as
set forth in the plan of reorganization, relying on section 505 of
the Code which authorizes the bankruptcy court to determine tax
liabilities 2 ' and section 944 of the Code which binds creditors to
the provisions of a confirmed plan.22 The IRS may counter that
they are not bound by such designation. 23 Herein lies the dispute which found its24way to the Supreme Court in United States v.

Energy Resources, Co.

corporation's president, secretary and treasurer are often considered responsible
persons for purposes of assessing the section 6672 penalty. IRS Policy Statement
P-5-60 (1984), reprinted in 1 ADMINISTRATION, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL (CCH),
1305-14 (1989).
17 26 U.S.C. § 6672 (1988). See supra note 11 for text of Code provision.
18 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(c) (1988); see also infra note 30 for relevant text of
Code provision.
19 The responsible persons of the corporation will always seek to apply the corporation's tax payments to the trust fund liabilities first in order to reduce their
personal liability under section 6672. See Note, The Solution to the Trust Fund Tax
Problem in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Proceedings: In re Energy Resources, Inc., 43 TAx LAw.
837 (1990).
20 Id. at 837-38.
21 See 11 U.S.C. § 505(a)(1) (1988). Section 505(a)(1) provides in relevant part:
[t]he court may determine the amount or legality of any tax, fine or
penalty relating to a tax, or any addition to tax, whether or not previously assessed, whether or not paid, and whether or not contested
before or adjudicated by a judicial or administrative tribunal of competent jurisdiction.
Id.
22 See 11 U.S.C. § 944 (1988). Section 944 (a)(3) provides in relevant part:
(a) The provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor and any
creditor, whether or not (3) such creditor has accepted the plan.
Id. Cases in which this position has been argued by the debtor include: In re RibsR-Us, 828 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. Technical Knockout Graphics,
Inc., 833 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. A & B Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 823 F.2d 462 (11 th Cir. 1987). See infra notes 68-81 and accompanying
text.
23 See supra notes 11 and 15.
24 110 S.Ct. 2139 (1990). For another discussion of Energy Resources, see Sabino,
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The Supreme Court in Energy Resources addressed the issue of
whether a bankruptcy court is authorized to order the IRS to apply tax payments of a corporation to satisfy its trust fund tax liability before applying payments to its nontrust fund liabilities. 5
In finding that the bankruptcy court is granted the power, pursuant to section 105(a) of the Code, to direct the allocation of tax
payments under a plan of reorganization, the Court held that
such allocation must be necessary and appropriate to the success
of the reorganization.26
Energy Resources involved two separate chapter 11 reorganization proceedings. 2 7 Energy Resources Co. and Newport Offshore, Ltd. both filed voluntary petitions for reorganization
under chapter 11.28 At the time of the filing, both companies had
outstanding tax liabilities which consisted of trust fund and nontrust fund taxes.2 9 The reorganization plans of both companies,
which were confirmed by the bankruptcy court, provided for the
tax liability to be satisfied within six years. 30 Further, both corporations requested that the tax payments be applied to satisfy their
trust fund liabilities and interest before any amounts be applied
The Allocation of Payments to Trust Fund Taxes in Bankruptcy Reorganizations: The IRS vs.
The Bankruptcy Court, 18 J. CORP. TAX'N 339 (1991).
25 Energy Resources, 110 S. Ct. at 2140.
26 Id. at 2142.
27 Id. at 2141. Internal Revenue Service v. Energy Resources Co. and United
States v. Newport Offshore, Ltd. were consolidated in the First Circuit Court of
Appeals. See In re Energy Resources Co., 59 Bankr. 702 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986),
aff'd, No. 86-1533Mc, slip op. (D. Mass. Aug. 5, 1987), aff'd, 871 F.2d 223 (1st Cir.
1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 402 (1989); aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 2139 (1990); In re Newport Offshore, Ltd., 75 Bankr. 919 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1987), rev'd, No. CA 87-0433, slip
op. (D.R.I. Dec. 9, 1987), rev'd sub nom., In re Energy Resources Co., 871 F.2d 223
(1st Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 402 (1989), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 2139 (1990).
28 Energy Resources, 110 S. Ct. at 2141. Section 301 of the Code allows individuals, partnerships and corporations to file for reorganization. 11 U.S.C. §§ 301,
109(a), 101(35) (1988).
29 See Energy Resources, 110 S. Ct. at 2141.
Energy Resources Co. owed approximately $1,000,000 in delinquent taxes. Id. at 2141. Newport Offshore's federal tax
debt totalled approximately $300,000. Id.
30 Id. Section 1129(a)(9)(C) of the Code requires all tax claims to be fully paid
within six years. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(c) (1988). Section 1129(a)(9)(C) provides
in pertinent part:
with respect to a claim of a kind specified in section 507(a)(7) of this
title, the holder of such claim will receive on account of such claim
deferred cash payments, over a period not exceeding six years after
the date of assessment of such claim, of a value, as of the effective date
of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim.
Id. The specified claim under section 507(a)(7) refers to unsecured claims brought
by governmental units which frequently includes claims for delinquent taxes. See
11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (1988).
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to their nontrust fund debts. 3 ' The IRS objected to this proposed application of the tax payments arguing that they had the
right to apply the payments first to the nontrust taxes.3 2
The IRS asserted that tax payments made pursuant to a plan
of reorganization are involuntary;3 3 therefore, according to IRS
policy, the taxpayers cannot designate the priority with which the
tax liability ought to be paid. 34 The IRS further argued that the
bankruptcy courts' orders are inconsistent with provisions in the
Code which precipitate the collection of all delinquent taxes by
the government.3 5 Both the Massachusetts Bankruptcy Court3 6
and the Rhode Island Bankruptcy Court3 7 held that tax payments
made pursuant to a chapter 11 plan of reorganization are volun31 Additionally, the plan of Energy Resources allowed the company to prepay
trust fund taxes as they saw fit. Energy Resources, 110 S. Ct. at 2141. The trustee of
the Erco Liquidation Trust (the Trust established under Energy Resources' Third
Amended Plan of Reorganization) sent the IRS payments to be applied to the trust
fund portion of the corporation's tax debt. In re Energy Resources Co., 59 Bankr.
702, 703 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986). The IRS refused to apply the payments in the
manner designated by the trustee, thereby prompting the trustee to petition the
bankruptcy court to so order the IRS. Id.
With respect to Newport Offshore, Ltd., the IRS objected to the provision in
the plan of reorganization which designated that the trust fund taxes be paid first.
In re Newport Offshore, Ltd., 75 Bankr. 919, 920 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1987). The plan
provided for payments to be credited to the trust fund portion, and interest accrued thereon. Id. Once these liabilities were extinguished, payment would then
be applied to the "oldest nontrust fund portion of the remaining tax obligations."
Id. at 920 (citation omitted).
32 See Energy Resources, 59 Bankr. at 704; Newport Offshore, 75 Bankr. at 920 (citation omitted).
33 See Energy Resources, 110 S. Ct. at 2141.
34 See id. See also I.R.S. Policy Statement P-5-60 (1984), reprintedin 1 ADMINISTRATION, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL (CCH) 1305-14 (1989). The IRS Policy Statement provides that:
In determining the amount of the 100-percent penalty to be assessed
in connection with withheld income and employment taxes, and any
payment made on the corporate account involved is deemed to represent payment of the non-withheld portions of the liability (including
assessed and accrued penalty and interest) unless there was some specific designation to the contrary by the taxpayer. The taxpayer, of
course, has no right of designation in the case of collections resulting
from enforced collection measures. To the extent partial payments
exceed the non-withheld portion of the tax liability, they are considered as being applied against the trust fund portion of the assessment.
Id.
35 Energy Resources, 110 S. Ct. at 2142. The Government relied on section
507(a)(7) of the Code which grants tax claims seventh priority and section
523(a)(l)(A) which declares tax debts nondischargeable. Id. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 507(a)(7), 523(a)(1)(A) (1988).
36 In re Energy Resources, 59 Bankr. 702 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1986).
37 In re Newport Offshore, 75 Bankr. 919 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1987).
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tary. s8 The debtors thus could direct the IRS to apply the payments to the trust fund portion of their tax liabilities.3 9 Both
bankruptcy courts found that the IRS did not take the requisite
judicial action against the debtors in order for the payment to
be characterized as involuntary.4 ' The designation of the payments, the courts found, were in compliance with section 1129 of
the Code which requires only that payment of prepetition taxes
be made within six years. 4 2
38 Energy Resources, 59 Bankr. at 706; Newport Offshore, 75 Bankr. at 922-23. In
Energy Resources, the Trustee of the Liquidation Trust moved for an order directing
the IRS to honor the designation and apply the tax payments to the corporation's
trust fund tax liabilities. Energy Resources, 59 Bankr. at 704. The Trustee argued:
first, that the ability to designate payments was essential to his duty to maximize the
benefit of the tax payments to the bankrupt estate; second, that the IRS will incur
no loss by the designation since the reorganization plan provides for full payment
of all tax debts; third, that the designation of such payments was in accordance with
a settlement agreement with a former officer of the corporation which was aimed at
forestalling personal liability for trust fund taxes; and fourth, that such payments
made under a reorganization plan can be designated because they are voluntary.
Id.
The court therefore found the plan binding on the IRS. Id. at 707 (citing In re
St. Louis Freight Lines, Inc., 45 Bankr. 546 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984) for the proposition that the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction under section 1141 (a) of the Code
to interpret the plan including the designation of tax payments). Section 1141(a)
provides that confirmation binds creditors, the debtor and other interested parties
irrespective of whether they have accepted the plan. See 11 U.S.C. 1141(a). This
notion has been applied to bind the IRS as well as other taxing authorities to the
terms of the confirmed plan. See In re St. Louis Freight Lines, Inc., 45 Bankr. 546,
553 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984).
The Rhode Island Bankruptcy Court took a more flexible approach by deciding to consider each case on its own facts and evaluate the totality of the circumstances surrounding each plan. Newport Offshore, 75 Bankr. at 922-23 (citing In re B
& P Enterprises, Inc., 67 Bankr. 179 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1986). The Newport Offshore court found the fact that the funding of the plan came from a third party to be
critical to the determination of whether a tax payment is voluntary or involuntary.
Id. at 922. When third-party funding has been supplied, in the court's view, that
factor alone was sufficient to render a payment to the IRS voluntary, thereby allowing the designation of the payment to trust fund taxes to stand. Id. (citing Energy Resources, 59 Bankr. 702; In re Franklin Press, Inc., 52 Bankr. 151 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1985).
39 Energy Resources, 59 Bankr. at 707; Newport Offshore, 75 Bankr. at 923.
40 See infra notes 56-81 and accompanying text (describing the notion of involuntary tax payments).
41 Energy Resources, 59 Bankr. at 705 (citations omitted); see Newport Offshore, 75
Bankr. at 922 (citing In re B & P Enters., 67 Bankr. 179 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1986)).
The bankruptcy courts noted that merely filing a proof of claim and objecting to the
confirmation of a reorganization plan in a chapter 11 proceeding does not rise to
the level ofjudicial action necessary to render tax payments made under a plan of
reorganization involuntary. Energy Resources, 59 Bankr. at 705 (citations omitted);
see Newport Offshore, 75 Bankr. at 922.
42 Energy Resources, 59 Bankr. at 705-06 (quoting In re A & B Heating & Air Conditioning Co., 53 Bankr. 54 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1985) ("[t]he debtor propounding a
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On appeal, the United States District Court for the District
of Massachusetts affirmed the bankruptcy court. 43 The court determined that confirmation of a chapter 11 plan of reorganization
under section 1129 does not rise "to the level of a seizure," and
therefore could not constitute the kind of "court action" which
would trigger the characterization of the payments as involuntary. 44 The United States District Court for the District of Rhode
Island, however, reversed the bankruptcy court. 45 The district
court held that the debtor could not direct the application of
chapter 1I tax payments to Newport Offshore's trust fund tax
liabilities because Congress did not intend for a bankruptcy court
to have the power to allow responsible persons to indirectly relieve themselves of personal liability for the payment of trust
fund taxes.46
On the consolidated appeal of the district court decisions,
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed
Energy Resources and reversed Newport Offshore. 47 The circuit court
held that the allocation of tax payments made under a plan of
reorganization should be decided on a case-by-case basis at the
bankruptcy judge's discretion. 48 The court noted that tax payplan has a number of options with respect to treatment of a claim by the IRS and it
is the freedom afforded by these options which dictates the conclusion that payments to the IRS
pursuant to a confirmed chapter 11 plan of reorganizationare voluntary.") (emphasis added)); Newport Offshore, 75 Bankr. at 923; 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) (1988); seesupra
note 30 for relevant text of the Code provision. Section 1 129(a) (11) requires that a
plan of reorganization must be likely to succeed in order to be confirmed. See 11
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (1988).
43 In re Energy Resources Co., No. 86-1533Mc, slip op. 24a (D. Mass. Aug. 5,
1987), aff'd, 871 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 402 (1989), aff'd,
110 S. Ct. 2139 (1990).
44 Energy Resources, No. 86-1533Mc at 26a. The court emphasized that it did not
"compel action, rather it approved a payment which the debtor wished to make."
Id. The court also was persuaded as to the voluntary characterization of these payments by the fact that they were in accordance with a voluntary chapter 11 reorganization. See id.
45 United States v. Newport Offshore, Ltd., No. CA 87-0433, slip op. at 27a
(D.R.I. Dec. 9, 1987), rev'd sub nom., In re Energy Resources Co., 871 F.2d 223 (1st
Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 402 (1989), aff'd, 111 S.Ct. 2139 (1990).
46 United States v. Newport Offshore, Ltd., No. CA 87-0433, slip op. at 29a-30a
(D.R.I. Dec. 9, 1987). The court adopted the reasoning of the Third Circuit. Id.
(citing In re Ribs-R-Us., 828 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1987) (chapter 11 corporate debtor
could not direct allocation of payments on its prepetition federal tax liabilities because payments under a reorganization plan are voluntary)). See infra notes 76-81
and accompanying text.
47 In re Energy Resources Co., 871 F.2d 223, 234 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. granted,
110 S.Ct. 402 (1989), aff'd, 110 S. Ct. 2139 (1990).
48 Id. at 233 (citing In re A & B Heating & Air Conditioning, 823 F.2d 462 (1 th
Cir. 1987)).
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ments made under a plan of reorganization are properly characterized as involuntary according to IRS rules.49 Irrespective of
this characterization, the circuit court concluded that the bankruptcy court had the power to order the IRS to apply the tax payments to the corporation's trust fund taxes.5" The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari5 ' to resolve the conflict
amongst the circuits52 and subsequently affirmed the First Circuit's decision." The Court held that the bankruptcy court has
49 Id. at 227, 230. The court noted that labeling tax payments as voluntary or
involuntary was a matter governed by internal IRS policy. Id. at 228-30. A voluntary tax payment is one made before a legal proceeding is brought against the taxpayer by the IRS. Id. at 228. When a taxpayer's property is seized and transmitted
to the IRS, this falls within the definition of involuntary. Id. In the IRS's view, the
fact that the taxpayer's assets in a chapter 11 proceeding are under the court's control, coupled with the necessity that the court must confirm the plan, brings these
payments more closely under the rubric of involuntary. Id. Although the court recognized the arguments favoring a determination that the payments are voluntary, it
nevertheless accepted the IRS's position as reasonable. See id. at 229-30. In accepting this position, however, the court stressed the limitation of such a conclusion, "[this] only means . .. that the IRS's own rules and regulations do not compel [the
IRS] to accept the taxpayer's determinations as to how it must apply payments here
at issue." Id. at 230 (emphasis in original).
50 Id. at 226, 230-32. The court set forth a six part rationale for its ruling: (1) a
bankruptcy court is statutorily vested with broad equitable powers (citing Pepper v.
Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304-05 (1939); Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459 (1913);
Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank of Montevideo, Minn., 719 F.2d 270, 273 (8th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012 (1984); In re Leasing Consultants, Inc., 592 F.2d
103, 107 (2d Cir. 1979); 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1); 11 U.S.C. § 105); (2) a bankruptcy
court is empowered to direct creditors to apply a debtor's payments to particular
debts (60 AM. JUR.2d § 103 (1987); Commercial Credit Corporation v. Schwartz,
130 F. Supp. 524, 530-31 (E.D. Ark. 1955)); cf. Amos v. Commissioner 47 T.C. 65,
70 n.5 (1966); Energy Resources, 871 F.2d at 227 (citations omitted); (3) a bankruptcy
court's power to allocate payments is not limited when the creditor is the Internal
Revenue Service; (4) administratively, a bankruptcy court is in a better position to
determine the allocation of a reorganizing corporation's tax payments; (5) the IRS's
policy of applying a corporate debtor's taxes to nontrust fund taxes first is an internal rather than a statutory policy; (6) the Code does not explicitly or implicitly prescribe bankruptcy court action directing application of reorganization tax payments
to trust fund taxes. Id.
51 110 S. Ct. 402 (1989), af'd, 110 S. Ct. 2139 (1990).
52 In re Energy Resources Co., 110 S. Ct. 2139, 2141 (1990). See In re Energy
Resources, 871 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 402 (1989), aft'd,
110 S. Ct. 2139 (1990) (bankruptcy court authorized to allocate "involuntary" tax
payments to debtor's trust fund taxes to the exclusion of nontrust fund taxes); In re
A & B Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 823 F.2d 462 (11th Cir. 1987) (same).
Contra In re Ribs-R-Us, Inc., 828 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1987) (tax payments under a
reorganization plan are per se involuntary and bankruptcy court lacks authority to
order IRS to apply tax payments to corporation's trust fund obligations);
DuCharmes & Co. v. Michigan (In re DuCharmes), 852 F.2d 194 (6th Cir. 1988)
(per curiam) (same); United States of America v. Technical Knockout Graphics, Inc.
(In re Technical Knockout Graphics, Inc.), 833 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1987) (same).
53 Energy Resources, 110 S. Ct. at 2139.
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the power to order the IRS to apply a reorganizing corporation's
tax payments to trust fund taxes when necessary to ensure a successful reorganization. 4 The Court stated that the bankruptcy
court possesses such broad powers irrespective of whether the
payments are characterized as voluntary or involuntary. 5
II.

THE DEMISE OF THE VOLUNTARY/INVOLUNTARY
CHARACTERIZATION IN BANKRUPTCY

Surprisingly, the Supreme Court in Energy Resources ignored
the basis upon which the lower courts had previously analyzed
this issue. Historically, the issue of whether the IRS may allocate
tax payments was determined by the characterization of the payments as either voluntary or involuntary. 56 According to IRS
policy, a taxpayer making an involuntary tax payment cannot designate to which of his debts the payments should be applied.57 In
contrast, a voluntary payment can be so designated and the IRS
is compelled to honor that designation.58
The application of this characterization to tax liabilities of a
financially ailing corporation was addressed by the Seventh Circuit in Muntwyler v. United States. 59 In Muntwyler, the IRS filed a

tax claim with the trustee for the benefit of creditors of Air MidAmerica Airlines, a company which ceased operations because of
its poor financial condition. 60 The trustee paid approximately
one-third of the tax liability and directed the payments to be allocated to the trust fund tax liabilities. 6 Instead, the IRS applied
the entire amount of the non-trust fund portion, asserting that
the filing of its claim with the trustee rendered the trustee's pay54 Id. at 2143.
55 Id. at 2142-43.
56 Note, The Solution to the Trust Fund Tax Problem in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Proceedings: In re Energy Resources, Inc., 43 TAx LAw. 837, 840 (1990). See, e.g., In re Ribs-RUs, Inc., 828 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1987) (tax payments to IRS were involuntary when
made pursuant to Chapter 11 plan of reorganization); Muntwyler v. United States,
703 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1983) (taxpayer could allocate voluntary tax payments);
Amos v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 65 (1966) (taxpayer could not allocate involuntary
tax payments).
57 IRS Policy Statement P-5-60 (1984), reprinted in I ADMINISTRATION, INTERNAL
REVENUE MANUAL (CCH) 1305-14 (1989). See supra note 15 for text.
58 Id.
59 703 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1983).
60 Id. at 1031. All of Air Mid-America's assets were assigned to the trustee who
was authorized to collect debts, sell the company's interest, and pay the claims of
the creditors. Id. Air Mid-America Airlines owed the IRS both employee withholding taxes and excise (nontrust fund) taxes, Id. The IRS's claim was for both trust
fund and nontrust fund taxes. Id.
61 Id. at 1031.

878

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 21:868

ments involuntary because they were made pursuant to "administrative action."162 Contrary to the IRS's position, the court in
Muntwyler held that filing a claim for delinquent taxes with a
trustee was not sufficient to render the tax payment involuntary. 63 The court stated that administrative action alone is not
determinative of the involuntary nature of a payment.6 Rather,
to be involuntary, the payments must result from "court action or
administrative action resulting in an actual seizure of property or
money in a levy." 65 Finding that there had been no seizure of
assets by the IRS, nor any other "enforced collection "measure,"
the court allowed the application of the payments to be made to
66
the trust fund taxes.

62 Id. at 1032. Borrowing the oft-cited definition of involuntary articulated in
Amos v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 65, 69 (1966), the government argued that filing a
claim with a trustee is an administrative action to the same extent that a levy is an
administrative action. Muntwyler, 703 F.2d at 1033. See Amos, 47 T.C. at 69 (an
involuntary payment of taxes is "any payment received by agents of the United
States as a result of distraint or levy or from a legal proceeding in which the government is seeking to collect its delinquent taxes or file a claim therefor").
63 Muntwyler, 703 F.2d at 1033.
64 Id. at 1034.
65 Id. (emphasis in original). Where the IRS seizes corporate assets, the court
noted that the situation is entirely distinguishable. Id. In those circumstances, the
tax payments can be characterized as involuntary. Id.; see also United States v.
DeBeradinis, 395 F. Supp. 944 (D. Conn. 1975), aff'd mem., 538 F.2d 315, 952 (2d
Cir. 1976) (payments are involuntary when they result from IRS levies or participation in litigation); IRS Policy Statement P-5-60 (1984), reprintedin 1 Administration,
Internal Revenue Manual (CCH) 1305-14 (1989) (taxpayer has no right of designation when collections result from enforced collection measures). The issue of what
constitutes "seizure" of property and under what circumstances the IRS is authorized to "seize" assets without having the seizure construed as a voidable preference
is not without its difficulties. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (trustee may avoid transfer of a
debtor's interest in property to or for the benefit of a creditor made while debtor is
insolvent, within 90 days before filing, that enables debtor to receive more than he
should have received in a Chapter 7 liquidation); United States v. Daniel (In re R &
T Roofing Structures & Commercial Framing, Inc)., 79 Bankr. 22 (D. Nev. 1987).
In R & T Roofing, the IRS levied upon and seized moneys from a Chapter 7 debtor's
bank account for unpaid employee withholding taxes within the 90 day period. Id.
at 23 (the tax lien, however, was perfected outside of the 90 day period). The court
found that the seizure of money from a bank account to be voidable and thus ordered the IRS to return the money back to the trustee. Id. at 26. It is important to
note that the Muntwyler court may have held otherwise had the corporation filed for
bankruptcy. Muntwyler, 703 F.2d at 1034 n.2. The court thus distinguished between a formal bankruptcy proceeding and an assignment for the benefit of creditors. Id. See also United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983)
(property seized to satisfy unpaid Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act taxes
and federal taxes withheld from employees pursuant to levy and provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code subject to section 542(a) of the Bankruptcy Code requiring
delivery of such property to the trustee subject to specific conditions for protection
of creditors with interest in property).
66 Id. at 1033-34
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In 1987, the Eleventh Circuit considered whether tax payments in a chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding were voluntary.
In In re A & B Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. ,68 the IRS levied
upon the assets of the company for delinquent trust fund taxes.6 9
Ten days later, the corporation filed a petition for reorganization
under chapter 11 of the Code. 70 The plan of reorganization provided for payment of all the tax deficiencies over six years with
the initial payments being allocated to the trust fund taxes. 7 '
The Eleventh Circuit held that it was within the bankruptcy
court's discretion to determine whether the payments in a chapter 11 case are voluntary based upon consideration of the plan of
reorganization as a whole. 72 The court stated that the bankruptcy court should consider the debtor's history,7 3 the reorganization plan,7 and any previous agreements with or actions of the
67 In re A & B Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 823 F.2d 462, 463 (11 th Cir.
1987).
68 Id.
69 Id. at 463.
70 Id.

71 Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(C) (1988); see supra note 30 for relevant text of
Code provision.
72 A&B Heating, 823 F.2d at 465 (citing In re B & P Enter., Inc., 67 Bankr. 179,
183 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1986)). The court weighed the competing policies behind
the Internal Revenue Code and the Bankruptcy Code. Id. at 464-65. The Internal
Revenue Service's goal is "to maximize the public fisc." Id. at 465. The Bankruptcy Code's provisions manifest a preference for reorganization believing that
reorganization preserves the entity's economic life and provides more security of
repayment to creditors. Id. The court noted that in a chapter 11 proceeding, denying the debtor the ability to allocate tax payments may be fatal to its reorganization.
Id. The court further stated:
If corporate officers are pressured to pay the taxes out of their own
pockets, the incentive to continue successful reorganization is reduced, and it becomes more likely that the responsible officers will
convert to chapter 7 liquidation. [footnote omitted]. Under chapter
7, as in chapter 11, taxes have priority; [footnote omitted] the government will be paid in full whether sufficient funds remain for other unsecured creditors or not. The responsible officers are guaranteed that
no tax penalty will be assessed against them personally. [footnote
omitted].
Id. (citing Note, Bankruptcy CourtJurisdictionand the Power to Enjoin the IRS, 70 MINN.
L. REV. 1279, 1299-1300 (1986)),
73 Id. at 466 (citing In re B & P Enter., Inc., 67 Bankr. 179, 184 (Bankr. W.D.
Tenn. 1986)).
74 Id. at 466. The Eleventh Circuit urged the bankruptcy court to scrutinize the
proposed plan of reorganization and determine whether it is "[mierely a stop gap
scheme..." to fend off the IRS until the trust fund tax liabilities are paid. Id. The
court feared that debtors would use chapter 11 proceedings to pay off trust fund
tax debts with no intention of fulfilling its obligation under its reorganization
scheme. Id.
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Internal Revenue Service and any special circumstances. 75
The Third Circuit took a different approach to the designation of tax payments than that taken by the Eleventh Circuit in In
re Ribs-R-Us, Inc.76 In that case, the corporate debtor, Ribs-R-Us,
voluntarily filed a chapter 11 petition for reorganization which
provided for all tax liabilities to be paid within six years with the
initial tax payments being applied to the trust fund tax liabilities.7 7 The Third Circuit rejected the discretionary case-by-case
method claiming that its unpredictability does not provide the
IRS, debtors, or creditors with any certainty as to whether a chapter 11 reorganization will be upheld.78 The court reasoned that a
bankruptcy court's power to allocate tax payments is a question
of law to which a uniform federal rule ought to be applied.7 9
Thus, the Third Circuit held that the payments in this case were
involuntary in light of the significant restraints imposed upon the
debtor in a chapter 11 reorganization,8" and in view of Congres75 Id. The court consequently remanded the case for a determination of
whether permitting the debtor to allocate tax payments would best serve all the
parties' interests. Id.
76 828 F.2d 199, 202 (3d Cir. 1987).
77 Id. at 199-200. Ribs-R-Us, Inc., managed a restaurant in New Jersey and after
filing for reorganization continued to operate the business as a debtor in possession. Id. at 199-200; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1988) (permits debtor to remain in
possession rather than appoint a trustee). Subsequently, the United States filed a
proof of claim for delinquent trust fund and nontrust fund taxes. Ribs-R-Us, 828
F.2d at 199.
78 Id. at 202.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 203-04. When the debtor files for reorganization under chapter 11, the
debtor's assets vest in the bankruptcy estate. Id. at 202. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541
(1988) (commencing bankruptcy case creates an estate comprised of the debtor's
property)). The debtor is then relegated to the position of debtor in possession
and assumes the fiduciary duties of a trustee for the benefit of creditors. Id. at 203
(citing 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1988) (debtor in possession has all the rights and limitations of a Chapter 11 trustee)); Wolf v. Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633, 649-50 (1963)
(duties which debtor in possession must perform are those imposed on trustee).
Upon confirmation of the plan, the debtor is bound by its terms. Id. at 203 (citing
11 U.S.C. § 1141(a)).
The bankruptcy court is authorized under § 505 to determine the debtor's tax
obligations. Id. at 202; (citing 11 U.S.C. § 505 (1988) ("the court may determine
the amount or legality of any tax")); see supra note 21 for relevant text of Code
provision. Further, § 507(a)(7) tax claims are accorded a priority status and must
be paid within six years. Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 202-03; (citing 11 U.S.C.
§ 507(a)(7) (grants tax claims seventh priority); § 1129(a)(9)(C) (§ 507(a)(7) claims
must be paid in full within six years)). Finally, the bankruptcy court is authorized to
issue any orders that are necessary to ensure a successful reorganization. Id. at 203
(citing 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988) (bankruptcy court authorized to issue orders necessary or appropriate to accomplish reorganization); 11 U.S.C. § 1142(b) (1988)
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sional policy to ensure that tax revenues be secured.8
III.

THE ASCENT OF SECTION

105

Until the Supreme Court decided Energy Resources, it had not
relied on section 105 to support the bankruptcy court's exercise
of power with respect to any matter. The lower courts, however,
found section 105 to provide an adequate basis for the exercise
of power in situations where other provisions of the Code did not
specifically so provide. 82 In the oft-cited case of In re Otero Mills,
Inc. , the United States District Court for the District of New
Mexico considered the issue of whether the bankruptcy court had
the power under section 105 to enjoin a third party, Security
Bank and Trust, from collecting upon its state court judgment
against the president of Otero Mills, Inc., the guarantor for outstanding promissory notes. 84 Otero Mills, Inc., filed for chapter
11 reorganization, but since the president had personally guaranteed promissory notes issued in favor of the bank, the bank proceeded in state court against the president.8 a The court held that
a bankruptcy court has the power to issue injunctions against a
nonbankrupt party where the third party's state proceeding is re(bankruptcy court can direct parties to effect a transfer of property or any other act
to satisfy a lien pursuant to a confirmed plan of reorganization)).
81 Ribs-R-Us, 828 F.2d at 203. The Third Circuit's opinion was followed by the
Ninth Circuit in In re Technical Knockout Graphics, Inc., 833 F.2d 797 (9th Cir.
1987). In that case, the payments were made after the filing of a Chapter 11 petition, but before confirmation of the plan. Id. at 798. The circuit court did not find
this distinction meaningful to its finding that tax payments made after the filing are
involuntary. Id. at 802-03. Instead, the court found the significant action to be
that of filing a bankruptcy petition. See id. at 802. Upon filing, the court noted, it
properly becomes that of the estate and must be managed in accordance with the
regulations and responsibilities set forth in the Code. Id. at 802-03; see also supra
notes 30, 127 (describing specific rules and constraints imposed upon a debtor in
possession under the Code).
In the Ninth Circuit's view, to allow a debtor to give trust fund taxes priority in
applying tax payments without notice or approval of the court would benefit responsible officers to the detriment of other creditors as well as the IRS. Id. at 80203. Interestingly, the bankruptcy appellate panel found that the bankruptcy court
possessed such power under § 505. Id. at 800. The court observed that § 505 allows the court to determine the amount of tax liability owed - something which was not
in dispute in this case. Id. at 803 (emphasis added).
82 Otero Mills, Inc. v. Security Bank & Trust (In re Otero Mills, Inc.), 25 Bankr.
1018 (D.N.M., 1982).
83 Id. at 1018.
84 Id. at 1019.
85 Id. The bankruptcy court issued a preliminary injunction against the bank to
prevent it from enforcing a state court judgment against the president. Id. Less
than one month later, the bankruptcy court made the injunction permanent. Id.
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lated to the chapter 11 proceeding. 6 The court read section
1471 of the Judiciary Act, the provision granting a bankruptcy
court jurisdiction over "[a]ll civil proceedings arising under title
11. . ...
,"7in tandem with section 105, empowering a bankruptcy
court to issue orders which are necessary and appropriate to
carry out the provisions of chapter 11, for its holding."8 Having
found that the bankruptcy court had the jurisdiction to consider
issuing an injunction, 9 the court then proceeded to determine
whether, under the explicit language of section 105, the injunction was necessary and appropriate, 90 and related to the bankruptcy proceeding. 9 ' The court implied that the standard to
determine whether such action was "necessary and appropriate"
was similar to that of a traditional preliminary injunction. 2 Since
the success of the reorganization plan depended upon the contriId. at 1020-21.
Id. at 1021. 28 U.S.C. § 1471 provides that:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district
courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases
under title 11.
(b) Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court or courts, other than the district courts, the
district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of
all civil proceedings arising under title I or arising in or related
to cases under title 11.
(c) The bankruptcy court for the district in which a case under title 11
is commenced shall exercise all of the jurisdiction conferred by
this section on the district courts.
(d) Subsection (b) or (c) of this section does not prevent a district
courts [sic] or a bankruptcy court, in the interest of justice, from
abstaining from hearing a particular proceeding arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under title 11. Such abstention, or a decision not to abstain, is not reviewable by appeal
or otherwise.
(e) The bankruptcy court in which a case under title I is commenced
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all the property, whereever
[sic] located, of the debtor, as of the commencement of such case.
28 U.S.C § 1471 (Supp. 1982).
86
87

88 Otero Mills, Inc., 25 Bankr. at 1021.
89 Id. at 1020.
90 Id. at 1021.
91 Id.
92 Id. This standard was previously followed in In re Larmar Estates, Inc., 5
Bankr. 328, 331 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980) ("An order [staying a third party's action]
would be akin to a preliminary injunction"; bankruptcy court had power to enjoin
enforcement of state court judgment commenced by the Federal Deposit and Insurance Corporation against individual guarantors of Chapter 11 debtor, however,
guarantor did not sustain its burden of showing that injunction was necessary and
appropriate to debtor's reorganization). See Landmark Air Fund II v. Banchio National Bank, 19 Bankr. 556, 559 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982). In order to show that an
order is necessary and appropriate, the debtor must show:
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bution of assets by the Bank's president, enforcement of the state
judgment would impair, if not preclude, implementation of the
reorganization plan, thereby causing irreparable harm to the
estate.93
In strong support for the Otero Mills court interpretation of
section 105, the Eighth Circuit three years later in National Labor
Relations Board v. Superior Forwarding,Inc. " relied on the provision
to enjoin a federal regulatory proceeding. In that case, a trucking company, Superior Forwarding, Inc. (Superior), filed a voluntary petition under chapter 11 when a number of collective
bargaining agreements with several unions were in place. 95 After
Superior made some operational changes, several unions filed
complaints (fifty-two in total) of unfair labor practices with the
National Labor Relations Board (the Board).96 Superior sought
an injunction to prohibit the Board from proceeding against Superior, arguing that preparation for the hearings would occupy
management resources to the detriment of the company's reorganization efforts. 97 The Board contended, inter alia, that the
bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate unfair labor
practice issues and therefore could not enjoin the Board from
going forward. 98 The Eighth Circuit, however, concluded that
1. [a] strong or substantial likelihood or probability of success on the
merits;
2. [i]rreparable injury;
3. Whether the issuance of a preliminary injunction would cause substantial harm to others;
4. Whether the public interest would be served by issuing a preliminary injunction.
See Landmark Air Fund II, v. Bancohio National Bank, 19 Bankr. 556, 559 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio, W.D., 1982); see also GAF Corporation v. Johns-Manville Corp., 26
Bankr. 405, 415 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., 1983) (affirming the injunction standard as a
basis to interpret § 105 and declining to extend the automatic stay to encompass
nondebtor codefendants in asbestos product liability action).
93 Otero Mills, Inc., 25 Bankr. at 1021-22.
94 762 F.2d 695 (8th Cir. 1985).
95 Id. at 696. The bankruptcy court approved Superior's rejection of several of
the collective-bargaining agreements which were executory in nature. Id. Section
365 empowers a trustee to assume or reject any unexpired lease or executory contract of the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1988). An executory contract has been
defined as "a contract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the
other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of
the other." Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV.
439, 460 (1973).
96 Superior Forwarding, Inc., 762 F.2d at 696.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 698.
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section 105 gives a bankruptcy court the authority as well as the
discretion to enjoin federal regulatory proceedings when such
proceedings pose a threat to the assets of the debtor's estate.99
The Eighth Circuit, however, reserved in the bankruptcy courts
the power to decide under what circumstances the nature of such
proceedings would in fact constitute such a threat, thereby asserting that each case must be evaluated independently.' 0
Soon after the Eighth Circuit applied section 105 to estop a
federal agency from pursuing litigation against a bankrupt estate,
the Fourth Circuit was flooded with the highly publicized and
massive litigation related to the defective Dalkon Shield.' 0 ' The
manufacturer, A.H. Robbins Co., sought protection under chapter 11 from the veritable avalanche of actions for damages under
chapter 11.02 Since the filing of the petition automatically
stayed 10 3 all actions against Robbins, several plaintiffs proceeded
against one of the named co-defendants, Aetna Casualty and Insurance Company, with whom Robbins maintained a products liability policy.'0 4 Robbins filed an adversary proceeding seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief against the claimants arguing
that the insurance policy was property of the estate in which all
claimants had an interest. 10 5 The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit found that such action could be stayed under sec99 Id. at 698 (citations omitted). To reach this conclusion, the court first noted
that under 28 U.S.C. § 1471, a bankruptcy court has the jurisdiction over a debtor
by virtue of the act of filing a bankruptcy petition. Id.; see supra note 87 for text of
28 U.S.C. § 1471.
100 Superior Forwarding, Inc., 762 F.2d at 699. The court found support for its
conclusion in NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984) (court allowed
debtor-in-possession to reject an executory collective bargaining agreement); see
also Jackson, Bankruptcy Courts and the NLRB: A Clash ofJurisdictionOver Unfair Labor
Practices 1 Bank. Dev. J. 27 (1984).
101 See A.H. Robbins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1986); Official Dalkon
Shield Claimants' Committee v. Mabey, 880 F.2d 769, 776 (4th Cir. 1989); Oberg v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 828 F.2d 1023 (4th Cir. 1987).
102 A.H. Robbins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 996 (4th Cir. 1986).
103 Id. Section 362 provides for an automatic stay of all litigation against the
debtor upon the filing of a petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (1988) (exceptions to
the automatic stay).
104 A.H. Robbins Co., at 996-97. Robbins, in response, filed an adversary proceeding seeking declaratory relief adjudging the insurance policy to be an asset of the
debtor's estate in which all the claimants had an interest, and to restrain any actions
against Aetna. Id. The district judge enjoined the litigation against Aetna relying
on the automatic stay provision as well as section 105. Id. at 997. In the district
judge's view, such action threatened, burdened and impeded Robbins' reorganization efforts. Id.
105 Id.
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tion 362 as supplemented by section 105. ° 6 In the court's view,
the statutory power to stay actions regarding the debtor was not
confined to the automatic stay provision.' °7 Rather, section 105
provided the bankruptcy court with the general power to enjoin
actions that may interfere with the debtor's rehabilitation or to
protect the debtor's estate, irrespective of whether those actions
are excepted from the automatic stay provision.10 8 The bankruptcy court's power under section 105, the court contended,
must be considered in conjunction with the court's expanded jurisdiction under section 1471 of the Judiciary Act.' 0 9
Id. at 998-1003. The court found § 362(a)(1) applicable because the identity
between the third-party defendant (Aetna) and the debtor is such that a judgment
against Aetna would be tantamount to a judgment against Robbins. Id. at 999 (citing GAF Corporation v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 26 Bankr. 405, 410 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1983) (bankruptcy court may stay proceedings against nonbankrupt codefendants under section 362(a)(1) in "unusual circumstances") and Plessey Precision
Metals, Inc. v. The Metal Center, Inc., (In re Metal Center), 31 Bankr. 458 (Bankr.
D. Conn. 1983) (interpreting unusual circumstances to be when suit is against third
party who is entitled to absolute indemnity by debtor; protection can be extended
to others if result is binding on the debtor's estate)).Section 362(a)(1) of the Code
reads:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition
filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application
filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection
Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. § 78(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable
to all entities, of (1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or
employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other
action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have
been commenced before the commencement of the case
under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988) (emphasis added).
The court also found that subsection 362(a)(3) provided authority to stay the
proceedings. A.H. Robbins Co., 788 F.2d at 1001. Subsection 362(a)(3) (1988) applies to "any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from
the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (1988). The court found ample authority to support the notion that insurance contracts fall within the statutory definition of property. A.H. Robbins Co., 788 F.2d at 1001. (citing United States v. Whiting Pools,
Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983); In re Davis, 730 F.2d 176 (5th Cir. 1984); Lam, Cancellation of Insurance: Bankruptcy Automatic Stay Implications, 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 267
(1985);Johns-Manville Corporation v. The Asbestos Litigation Group (In reJohnsManville Corp.), 40 Bankr. 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)).
107 Id. at 1002.
108 Id. at 1003 (citing In re Johns-Manville Corp., 40 Bankr. at 226; In re Larmar
Estates, Inc., 5 Bankr. 328 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980); Landmark Air Fund II v.
Bancohio National Bank (In re Landmark), 19 Bankr. 556 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982);
Otero Mills, Inc. v. Security Bankr & Trust (In re Otero Mills, Inc.), 25 Bankr. 1018
(D.N.M. 1982)).
109 See A.H. Robbins Co., 788 F.2d at 1002-03 (citations and footnotes omitted).
See supra note 87 for text of 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (Supp. 1982).
106
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The use of section 105 as a basis of general equitable power
was not without its limitations. In 1989, the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of whether the bankruptcy court had the power
to permanently enjoin a creditor from enforcing a state court
judgment against nondebtors under the confirmation of a reorganization plan." ° In American Hardwoods,"' Deutsche Credit
Corporation financed machinery purchased by American Hardwoods which was guaranteed by two of the officers."t 2 When
American Hardwoods experienced financial difficulties, Deutsche
obtained a state court order to seize American Hardwood's machinery."' 3 American Hardwoods filed a petition under chapter
11 and, in response to a summary judgment motion filed by
Deutsche against the officers personally, commenced an adversary proceeding to prevent Deutsche from proceeding against
and enforcing any state court judgment." 4 Finding that there
were no unusual circumstances' ' 5 with respect to this situation,
the court held that the bankruptcy court lacked the power under
section 105 to permanently enjoin Deutsche from proceeding
against the Keelers. 1 6 The court found ample authority" 7 to
qualify this seemingly broad grant of equitable power as applicable only to relief consistent with specific laws' 1i and within the
110 American Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corporation (In re American
Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1989).
111 Id.
112 Id. at 622.
''3 Id.
114 Id. The officers, Craig and Gabriele Keeler, did not intend to contribute assets to American Hardwoods. Id. American Hardwoods argued nonetheless that
action against the Keelers would irreparably harm American Hardwoods. Id.
115 Id. at 627. The court borrowed the "unusual circumstance" test from the
Fourth Circuit decision in Menard-Stanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robbins), 880
F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989) (permanent injunction granted to protect the insurer of
A.H. Robbins against certain nondebtor third parties based on the unusual facts of
case). Id. at 626; see supra notes 101 to 109 and accompanying text for similar analysis in a sister case.
116 American Hardwoods, 885 F.2d at 626-27.
117 Id. at 624-25 (citing Clark v. United States (In re Heritage Village Church and
Missionary Fellowship, Inc.), 851 F.2d 104 (4th Cir. 1988) (§ 105 does not supersede Anti-Injunction Act prohibiting court from enjoining assessment or collection
of tax); Bear v. Coben (In re Golden Plan of Cal., Inc.), 829 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1986)
(equitable powers of bankruptcy court confined to prescribed limits of Bankruptcy
Act); Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank of Montevideo, Minn., 719 F.2d 270 (8th Cir.
1983) (broad equitable powers only exercisable in manner consistent with Code);
Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Pania (In re Pania), 65 Bankr. 865 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1986)).
118 American Hardwoods, 885 F.2d at 625 (citing In re Golden Plan of Cal., 829 F.2d
at 713).
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prescribed limits of the Code." t9 The court noted that section
524(e), which states that "discharge of a debt of a debtor does
not affect the liability of any other entity . . . for, such debt,''120 is
a specific limitation on the court's equitable powers under secbe used to discharge
tion 105.121 Therefore, such powers cannot
1 22
the personal liabilities of the guarantors.
IV.

IN RE ENERGY RESOURCES

It was against this background that the Supreme Court decided United States v. Energy Resources Co. 121 In Energy Resources, the
Court considered whether a bankruptcy court is authorized to order the IRS to apply tax payments made pursuant to a chapter 11
reorganization proceeding to trust fund liabilities before applying payments to other tax liabilities. 124 In a brief opinion, the
Court quickly disposed of the issue by holding that a bankruptcy
court is empowered to order tax payments to be applied to trust
fund taxes first, before applying the debtor's payments to other
tax liabilities in order to ensure the success of the plan of
25
reorganization.1
Justice White, writing for the Court,' 26 declared that
although the power to designate or approve the allocation of
payments is not expressly provided for in the Code, residual authority exists for such power in sections 105, 1123(b)(5) and
1129.127
119 American Hardwoods, 885 F.2d at 625 (citing Johnson v. First National Bank of
Montevideo, Minn., 719 F.2d at 273).
120 Id. at 625 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (1988)).
121 Id. at 626.
122 Id. at 625-26 (citing 1AJ. MOORE, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

16.14 at 1551

(14th ed. 1978); Union Carbide Corp. v. Newboles, 686 F.2d 593, 595 (7th Cir.
1982); RIDC Indus. Dev. Fund v. Snyder, 539 F.2d 487, 490 n.3 (5th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1095 (1977) (quotations omitted). Although American Hardwoods was not seeking a discharge of Keeler's debt per se, the court characterized
the request for a permanent injunction as essentially a request of discharge. American Hardwoods, 885 F.2d at 626 (citations omitted).
123 110 S. Ct. 2139 (1990).
124 See id. at 2140.
125 Id. at 2141-42.
126 Id. at 2141. The opinion of the Court was joined by the ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. Id.
Justice Blackmun dissented without opinion. Id. at 2143.
127 Id. at 2142 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5) (1978)). Section 1123 entitled
"Contents of a Plan" states in relevant part that: "[under § 1123] (b)(5) a plan may
include any other appropriate provisions not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title." Id. Section 1129 entitled "Confirmation of Plan" provides inter
alia that the bankruptcy court "shall confirm a plan" that "complies with the appli-
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The Court held that under these provisions, a bankruptcy
court could approve plans of reorganization which were consistent with the provisions or purposes of the Code. 2 8 In addition,
the Court stated that these Code provisions are consistent with
the notion that bankruptcy courts generally exercise broad equitable powers to modify creditor-debtor relationships.' 2 9 Finally,
the Court suggested that the voluntary/involuntary distinction
was not controlling when the bankruptcy 3court
order was neces0
reorganization.
the
of
success
the
to
sary
The Court did, however, recognize that the Code provides
certain directives regarding tax payments which protect the government's collection ability.13 ' The Court noted that under section 507(a)(7) of the Code, certain taxes including trust fund
32
taxes are accorded seventh priority in the payment of claims.
In addition, section 523(a)(1)(A) prohibits an individual debtor
in bankruptcy from obtaining a discharge of debts incurred from
income, employment or withholding. 3 3 Finally, the Court
stressed that the provisions of section 1129 required payment of
all taxes within six years of assessment of the tax3 4 and mandate
that the bankruptcy court must assess the viability of a plan of
cable provisions of this title." 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(1); Energy Resources, 110 S. Ct. at
2142. Merging the legislative directives of 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(b)(5) and 1129, the
Court concluded that the bankruptcy court had the statutory authority to confirm
reorganization plans that provided for the application of tax payments to trust fund
taxes because the bankruptcy court had authority to approve "any appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provision of [the Code]." Id. (citing 11
U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988)); see supra note 1 (for text of § 105).
128 Energy Resources, 110 S. Ct. at 2142.
129 Id. (citing Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 327 (1966)); United States Nat'l
Bank v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 331 U.S. 28, 36 (1947); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295,
303-04 (1939)).
130 See id. at 2141-42.
131 Id. The court declared that "[iut is evident that these restrictions on the bankruptcy court's authority do not preclude the court from issuing orders" directing
application of a reorganizing corporation's tax payments to its trust fund liability.
Id.
132 Id. at 2142 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7) (1988) ("Priorities"). Section
507(a)(7) allows a seventh priority to "unsecured claims of governmental units" for
income tax, property tax, collected or withheld tax; employment tax on a wage, an
excise tax, a custom duty or a penalty for actual pecuniary loss." Id.
133 Id. at 2142 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(l)(A) (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7)
(1988)). Under § 523(a)(1)(A), a discharge such as the discharge of a corporation
for corporate taxes does not "discharge an individual debtor from any debt for a
tax or customs duty specified under § 507(a)(7)." 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(A) (1988).
134 Id. at 2142; 11 U.S.C. § 1 129(a)(9)(C) (1988). The bankruptcy court may confirm a plan only if, inter alia, the plan provides for the payment of § 507(a)(7) claims
within six years of the assessment of the tax. Id. It is typically the case that the tax
assessment is made before confirmation of the plan such that the confirmed plan
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reorganization before issuing an order confirming such plan. 13 5
In the Court's view, these restrictions were not applicable to
the present situation and therefore did not limit the bankruptcy
court's power to order the IRS to give preference to the trust
fund liability when allocating tax payments.M6 Although the
Court conceded that the government could maximize its chances
for recovery of all the taxes by preserving the corporate officers'
secondary liability for the trust fund debt, the Court found that
this additional protection was absent in the Code.3 7 The Court
contended that even if this government prerogative were provided for in the Code, a bankruptcy court order may be inappropriate if it contravened nonbankruptcy law.'3 8 The Court
suggested that the propriety of a bankruptcy court order lies in
the assumption that a bankruptcy court will consider nonbankruptcy law when issuing orders.'
The Court dispelled the government's assertion that the
bankruptcy court orders were in conflict with section 6672 of the
Internal Revenue Code.' 4 The Court maintained that its orders
do not prevent the IRS from collecting trust fund taxes from responsible officers. 1"' The Court emphasized that section 6672
should not be interpreted to protect against the possibility that
by applying tax payments to the trust fund tax liability thereby
extinguishing the responsible officer's secondary liability,42 nontrust fund taxes may never be collected from the debtor.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Court's decision to allow the bankruptcy court to order
application of tax payments is an attempt to reconcile and intemay provide for payment of the tax over a four or five year period. See, e.g., In re Du

Charmes & Co., 852 F.2d 194 (6th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).
135 Id. at 2142 (citing I I U.S.C. § 1 129(a)(11) (1988)). The Court must assure
itself that "[clonfirmation of a plan is not likely to be followed by liquidation, the

need for further financial reorganization, of the debtor or any successor to the
debtor under the plan, unless such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in the
plan." Id. at 1129(a)(11).
136 Id.at 2142.
137 Id.
138 Id. See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S.

494, 502 (1986) (court reprimanded a trustee's abandonment of contaminated
property stating that "[a] trustee is not to have carte blanche to ignore nonbankruptcy law").
139 See Energy Resources, 110 S. Ct. at 2142.

140 Id. See supra notes 13 to 19 and accompanying text.
141 Id. at 2143.
142 Id.
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grate the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and the Bankruptcy Code. 4 ' In this respect, the court avoided the inherent
conflict between the Internal Revenue Service's ability to designate tax payments, and the bankruptcy court's power to confirm
plans which allocate those same payments otherwise.' 4 4 The
Court was able to reach this result by distinguishing between specific provisions of the Internal Revenue Code regarding liability
for tax payments and the extent to which the Internal Revenue
Service can affirmatively act to enforce that liability. 45 Having
found no provision of the Internal Revenue Code that explicitly
allows the IRS to prefer one method of payment in order to maximize its collection payments, the Court avoided the resolution of
a statutory conflict. Hence, the opinion simultaneously gave due
weight to the statutory requirement that trust fund taxes must be
collected, 46 while subtly dismissing the IRS's administrative
preference for allocation of debtor corporation's tax payments. 47 The Court's opinion suggests that while the IRS may
continue vigilant execution of the tax code, it must exercise that
authority in such a way so as not to go beyond the scope of the
basic law and interfere with the debtor's decision to designate
48
those payments under a confirmed plan of reorganization.
143 See J. HALL, FOUNDATIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE 142, 161-64 (1973). Chapter
four of the book provides a basis for analyzing the Court's decision as a display of
the dynamism of legal philosophy, especially those philosophies which are based on
the notion that legal rules are consistent with higher norms, that statutory decisions
are consistent with the original legislation, and that legislation is consistent with the
constitution. Id. at 164 n.45 (citing Kelsen, GENERAL THEORY 122-23, 144 (1946)).
144 See In re Newport Offshore, Ltd., 75 Bankr. 919, 922 (Bankr. D. Rhode Island
1987). In re Energy Resources Co., 59 Bankr. 702, 706 (Bankr. Mass. 1986); see also
notes 56 to 81 and accompanying text. While the two bankruptcy court opinions in
this case favored the right of the debtor to designate the payments over IRS policy,
they set the stage for continued litigation regarding the designation of these payments as either voluntary or involuntary-an IRS internal procedure designationas determinative of the outcome. Implicit in this type of analysis is a notion that
internal IRS procedures should have the same power and effect as the tax code, and
that such internal procedures should preempt a bankruptcy court's equitable power
to decide otherwise.
145 See United States v. Energy Resources Co., 110 S. Ct. 2139, 2142-43 (1990).
The Court expressly recognized that I.R.C. § 6672 is an alternate source of collection of trust fund taxes. Id. at 2142.
146 See Energy Resources, 110 S. Ct. at 2143. The Court went so far as to state that
the bankruptcy court orders would enhance the collection of trust fund taxes because the Government would collect those taxes first before moving onto the collection of regular or nontrust fund taxes. Id.
147 See id. at 2143. With the exceptions of the recital of the procedural history
and facts of the case, the Court did not consider or mention the voluntary versus

involuntary distinction in its analysis. See id. 2139-43.
148 Id. at 2141.
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The Court was able to base its opinion in the language of the
federal bankruptcy statute.' 4 9 By noting the frequency with
which the statute dealt with federal tax liabilities, the Court was
persuaded that a bankruptcy court's section 105 equitable powers were intended to reach these debts as well.' 5 0 The Court's
reliance on the language of the bankruptcy code, however, may
provide a window of opportunity for critics of the opinion. While
other Code sections were noted, the basis of the Court's decision
was section 105-the provision allowing a bankruptcy court to
issue any order, process or judgment that is necessary or appropriate for successful reorganization.'
Given the Code's strong
preference towards rehabilitation, a bankruptcy court is likely to
favor application of tax payments to the trust fund liability irrespective of the responsible officer's actions or the circumstances
of the reorganization as long as it reasonably can be argued that
application favors reorganization. 52 With few notable exceptions, 15 a bankruptcy
court appears likely to allow the Code pro54
visions to prevail. 1
Energy Resources virtually eviscerates I.R.C. section 6672 in
the context of a chapter 11 reorganization. Secondary liability
for trust fund taxes on responsible officers is only meaningful to
the IRS only when the debtor lacks the financial wherewithal to
pay the trust fund debt. Rarely will there be cases where officers
149 Id. at 2142.
150 See id. (citing

11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5) ("Contents of a plan," provides that the
reorganization plan must on the whole be consistent with the Code); 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129 ("Confirmation of Plan" provides factors for the bankruptcy court to consider before ordering a proposed plan confirmed); 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (bankruptcy court must be confident that reorganization will succeed); 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(a)(9)(C) (tax debt must be paid off within six years).
151 Id. at 2142.
152 See supra notes 8 and 9 and accompanying text (Code provisions governing
Chapter 11 manifest strong policy to rehabilitate the debtor).
153 See, e.g., Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Envt'l Protection, 474
U.S. 494 (1986). In the landmark Midlantic decision, the Supreme Court affirmed
lower court rulings which reversed a bankruptcy court order permitting a trustee to
abandon contaminated and unprofitable property. Id. at 506-07. The Court concluded that Congress did not intend to provide the trustee via the abandonment
power of § 554(a) to pre-empt all local and state laws, particularly those designed
to protect health and safety. Id. See generally Terrell, Caveat Lender: The Midlantic
Decision and its Progeny 19 SETON HALL L. REV. 55, 63, 74-75 (1989) (Midlantic decision can be read in several ways, one of which is to allow environmental laws to take
precedence over other interests, including that of the trustee in abandoning burdensome property).
154 See Arizona Grocery v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R., 284 U.S. 370
(1932) (agencies and administrative courts ordinarily must follow its own rules and
are in the best position to interpret the statute).
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of a healthy corporation are threatened with section 6672 liability. It thus seems likely that officers of bankrupt corporations
were the primary targets for the section 6672 collection remedy.
By allowing a debtor to designate tax payments in a reorganization plan in such a way as to alleviate this section 6672 liability,
the Court essentially abrogated that legislative directive.
The Court could have effected a better reconciliation of this
problem by ordering tax payments to be applied against the trust
fund and nontrust fund obligations on a pro rata basis. Such a
rule would have simultaneously advanced the rehabilitative policy behind chapter 11 of the Code and the responsible officer liability of section 6672 of the Internal Revenue Code. With this
method, a portion of each tax payment would be applied to the
trust fund obligation and a portion would be applied to the nontrust fund portion. A responsible officer would therefore continue to have an economic incentive to actively participate in the
corporation's rehabilitation because his personal liability has not
been paid. Post Energy Resources, however, the responsible officer
has little incentive to continue the operations of the corporation
after the trust fund liability has been discharged. With a pro rata
scheme, responsible officers would remain economically interested in the solvency of the reorganized firm until both trust fund
and nontrust fund tax liabilities were satisfied. Apro rata scheme
would have simultaneously retained some bite to I.R.C. section
6672 and would have thus preserved the public fisc. The Energy
Resources Court, however, allowed bankruptcy courts to alter that
scheme and subordinate obligations within a classification which
the legislature had deemed to be all of equal priority. Adoption
of a pro rata scheme would restore that legislative mandate.
Perhaps the most disquieting effect of the Court's brief opinion is the implicit creation of a "priority within a priority" in the
absence of a legislative directive. Congress enacted section 507
of the Code to establish certain priorities in the payment of
debts.' 55 This system of priorities is designed to ensure payment
155 See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1988). Section 507(a)(7) accords seventh priority to
claims of government units. See id. It provides in relevant part:
(7) Seventh, allowed unsecured claims of governmental units, only to
the extent that such claims are for(A) a tax on or measured by income or gross receipts(i) for a taxable year ending on or before the date of the
filing of the petition for which a return, if required, is last
due, including extensions, after three years before the
date of the filing of the petition;
(ii) assessed within 240 days, plus anytime plus 30 days dur-
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to specific classes of claims by mandating that these claims be
paid first.' 56 Section 507(a)(7) accords seventh priority to certain
prepetition claims for taxes, including trust fund taxes and property, income and gross receipt taxes. 5 7 All priority claims are
payable out of unencumbered property of the estate prior to payment of general unsecured creditor claims. 58 When a debtor
cannot pay an entire class of priority claims, these claims are paid
on a pro rata basis. 159 Since both trust fund and nontrust fund
taxes fall within the section 507(a)(7) priority classification, pro
rata distribution seems only appropriate. 60 Energy Resources,
however, allows a bankruptcy court to alter that specific legislative scheme and subordination of obligations, i.e., nontrust fund
taxes, within a classification (section 507(a)(7)) which the legislaing which an offer in compromise with respect to such
tax that was made within 240 days after such assessment
was pending, before the date of the filing of the petition;
or
(iii) other than a tax of a kind specified in section
523(a)(l)(B) or 523(a)(1)(C) of this title, not assessed
before, but assessable, under applicable law or by agreement, after, the commencement of the case;
(B) a property tax assessed before the commencement of the case
and last payable without penalty after one year before the
date of the filing of the petition;
(C) a tax required to be collected or withheld and for which the
debtor is liable in whatever capacity; ...
(D) an employment tax on a wage, salary, or commission of a kind
specified in paragraph (3) of this subsection earned from the
debtor before the date of the filing of the petition, whether or
not actually paid before such date, for which a return is last
due, under applicable law or under any extension, after three
years before the date of the filing of the petition; ...
Id.
3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,
507.02 (15th Ed. 1988).
See I U.S.C. § 507(a)(7); see also supra note 155 for text of Code provision.
158 See, e.g., In re Seneca Oil Co., Bankr. Law Rep. (CCH)
73,506 (10th Cir.
1990) (administrative expense claims cannot be paid from funds over which constructive trust was imposed); In re American Resources Management Corp., 51
Bankr. 713, 719 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985) (encumbered property cannot be used as a
source of payment for administrative expenses unless there is equity in the collateral); see also 1 W. NORTON, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 12.02 (1987) (classification of priority is important because priority claims paid before unsecured
creditors or equity holders).
159 See, e.g., In re IML Freight, Inc., 52 Bankr. 124, 139 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985); see
also Norton, supra note 158, at § 12.03.
160 See, e.g., In re Wilnor Drilling, Inc., 29 Bankr. 727 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1982)
(claims for reimbursement of reasonable fees and expenses of members of equity
security holders' committee cannot be subordinated to claims for reimbursement of
similar claims made by members of official unsecured creditor's committee because
both entitled to first priority status).
156
'57
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ture had deemed to be of all equal priority. Although the powers
of a bankruptcy court under section 105 are indeed expansive,
they are, in the language of the provision itself, powers to "carry
out the provisions" of the Bankruptcy Code. Establishing such a
priority scheme appears outside of section 507(a)(7) and therefore, seems likely to be beyond the reach of section 105.
Cecelia N. Anekwe

